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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
Using Taxes to Support Multiple Health Insurance Risk Pools
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
As we write, healthcare reform has been 
declared dead – and risen from the dead – so 
many times that we have run out of zombie 
metaphors. We simply have no idea where we 
will be in the process when this article is 
published. We will nevertheless address a 
reform proposal advanced by U.S. Sen. Ted 
Cruz, R-Texas, because that proposal raises 
some fundamental questions about the nature of 
health insurance regulation in the United States. 
As has been widely reported, Cruz has been 
pushing a new health insurance deregulation 
proposal.1 If enacted, Cruz’s proposal would 
“allow insurers to sell individual-market plans 
that don’t meet the [Affordable Care Act’s] 
popular consumer protections—as long as they 
offer at least one plan in the same market that 
complies with those mandates.”2
The proposal raises fundamental questions 
about the nature of health insurance regulation 
in the United States. In most markets, it is 
considered desirable for consumers to have 
more choices. Other areas of law and regulation 
— such as antitrust law — are largely motivated 
by the goals of promoting choice and 
competition. But health insurance regulation is 
different.
The ACA prevents health insurance 
providers from denying coverage or charging 
more to those with preexisting health 
conditions. The health reform legislation that 
was recently passed by the House of 
Representatives — the American Health Care 
Act (AHCA) — would maintain those 
provisions.3 The version of that legislation that 
the Senate has been considering — the Better 
Care Reconciliation Act (BCRA) — would 
likewise maintain those provisions.4
Cruz’s proposal is different in that it would 
allow insurance providers to offer plans that deny 
David Gamage is a professor of law at 
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, 
and Darien Shanske is a professor at the 
University of California, Davis, School of Law 
(King Hall).
In this edition of Academic Perspectives on 
SALT, the authors discuss Republican U.S. 
Sen. Ted Cruz’s recent health insurance 
deregulation proposal. They explain concerns 
about the proposal and offer suggestions for 
how states could continue to insure their 
most vulnerable residents should the Cruz 
proposal be enacted as part of healthcare 
reform.
1
See Harris Meyer, “Cruz Insurance Proposal Underscores 
Trouble With Protecting Pre-Existing Conditions,” Modern 




For our prior essays analyzing the AHCA, see David Gamage 
and Darien Shanske, “The American Health Care Act Would Toss 
the States a Hot Potato,” State Tax Notes, May 8, 2017, p. 579; and 
Gamage and Shanske, “How States Can Respond to the AHCA: 
Using the McCarran-Ferguson Act,” State Tax Notes, July 24, 2017, p. 
367.
4
For discussion, see Margot Sanger-Katz, “Ted Cruz Has an Idea 
for How to Cover High-Risk Patients,” The New York Times, July 5, 
2017.
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coverage or charge more to those with preexisting 
health conditions — so long as each provider 
offered at least one other plan that didn’t contain 
those limitations.
It has long been understood by economists 
and by other healthcare experts that simply 
preventing insurance providers from denying 
coverage or charging more to those with 
preexisting health conditions can create adverse-
selection death spirals for the insurers.5 The 
danger is that healthier people might choose to 
purchase health insurance plans that provide 
better everyday benefits but worse coverage for 
expensive health conditions. Alternatively, 
healthier people might choose to forgo 
purchasing health insurance altogether.
Either way, that would leave insurance plans 
that offer good coverage for expensive health 
conditions with a sicker and more costly pool of 
insureds. To compensate, those plans would need 
to raise prices for all insureds,6 but that would 
further drive away healthier people, making the 
remaining pool of insureds even sicker and 
costlier, leading to further price increases, and so 
on.
In other words, giving consumers more 
choices when it comes to health insurance can 
result in the market collapsing — leaving the 
sickest and most needy consumers without any 
good choices.7 It should come as no surprise then 
that Cruz’s proposal has been widely criticized for 
threatening health insurance risk pools. By giving 
healthier consumers the choice of purchasing 
plans that are better for them — at least so long as 
they remain healthy — Cruz’s plan would 
threaten to undermine the coverage options 
available to sicker consumers.
That Cruz’s proposal would require health 
insurers to offer at least one plan that complies 
with the ACA’s consumer protections is of little 
help in that regard. Because healthier people 
could be expected to opt for the noncompliant 
plans, the pool of insureds interested in 
purchasing the compliant plans would become far 
sicker and costlier, resulting in insurance 
providers charging high prices for those plans.
By contrast, under the ACA, the healthcare 
exchanges were designed around maintaining a 
single exchange-based risk pool. Of course, 
employer-sponsored insurance plans were 
understood to be outside that single exchange-
based risk pool because employer populations 
were thought to be sustainable risk pools of their 
own, at least for large employers. But the ACA’s 
marketplace regulations were designed to 
prevent non-employer plans from undermining 
the single exchange-based risk pool. Again, Cruz’s 
plan would threaten that regulatory framework.
One problem with how the ACA’s regulations 
maintain the single exchange-based risk pool is 
that in doing so, those regulations limit the 
potentially positive aspects of consumer choice 
and provider competition.8 That is because health 
insurance providers have limited ability to design 
innovative new policies that might be more 
attractive overall, because those providers must 
comply with the ACA’s regulations that are meant 
to prevent adverse selection.
Put another way, there is a tension between 
limiting adverse selection in health insurance, on 
the one hand, and fostering innovation through 
market incentives, on the other. The ACA’s 
framework limits adverse selection but also limits 
innovation. Might there be a way for us to have 
our cake and eat it too? Could reforms limit 
adverse selection while also fostering more 
innovation through market incentives? Our 
tentative answer is yes.
We will now explain how a modified version 
of Cruz’s proposal could leave greater scope for 
innovation while still limiting adverse selection. 
One option would be for the federal government 
to commit to offering sufficient subsidies for those 
who purchase compliant plans, so that sicker 
individuals would not be priced out of the 
market. However, the cost of such subsidies 
5
See Gamage, “Perverse Incentives Arising From the Tax 
Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are 
Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income 
Workers,” 65 Tax L. Rev. 669, 676-679 (2012).
6
That is because the plans are forbidden from increasing prices 
only for sicker and more costly insureds.
7
For a more in-depth discussion of a similar dynamic outside 
the health insurance context, see Gamage and Allon Kedem, 
“Commodification and Contract Formation: Placing the 
Consideration Doctrine on Stronger Foundations,” 73 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1299, 1343-1347 (2006).
8
See John H. Cochrane, “After the ACA: Freeing the Market for 
Healthcare,” June 2014.
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would be very large. In any case, that is not part of 
Cruz’s proposal.9
Consider another potential modification to 
Cruz’s plan. Rather than the federal government 
undertaking to provide subsidies for compliant 
plans using general revenue, the federal 
government could instead tax noncompliant 
plans and then use the revenue to subsidize 
compliant plans. Those subsidies could either be 
in the form of direct payments to compliant plans 
(to reduce premiums) or in the form of tax credits 
made available to individuals and families who 
purchase compliant plans (to make those plans 
more affordable after tax).
Ideally, the size of those taxes and subsidies 
would be readjusted annually, with the size of the 
taxes and subsidies set to approximate the cost of 
complying with the ACA’s consumer protections. 
Put another way, the size of the taxes and 
subsidies should be set to approximate the 
externality that noncomplying plans impose on 
complying plans through adverse selection.
With that new proposed regulatory 
framework in place, health insurance providers 
would have greater freedom to devise innovative 
health insurance offerings. Any such offering that 
served the public good by creating more value for 
consumers than costs in the form of adverse-
selection externalities to compliant insurance 
plans should be profitable for the insurance 
provider even after the state-level taxes and 
subsidies. But plans that innovated only to drive 
away sicker insureds should not be profitable 
after the taxes and subsidies.
Of course, that modification would require 
that the federal government impose a large new 
tax and provide large subsidies. Again, that is not 
part of the Cruz plan. But, were the Cruz plan to 
be adopted, a state government could then adopt 
this approach. In other words, a state government 
could impose a tax on noncompliant plans to force 
them to internalize the cost of driving away sicker 
insureds.
Were a state government to do so, under the 
current federal regulatory framework we would 
recommend that the state government use state-
level tax credits for purchasing compliant plans 
rather than direct payments to compliant plans. 
That is for two major reasons. First, to the extent 
desired by the state government, those tax credits 
could be scaled to income to provide more benefit 
to the state’s low-income citizens. Second, using 
subsidies to reduce the premiums charged for 
exchange-based plans would result in a state’s 
citizens receiving smaller tax credits from the 
federal government. By contrast, providing 
additional state-level tax credits would not reduce 
the pretax price of the premiums for compliant 
exchange-based plans. Thus, that approach 
would not reduce the size of the federal tax credits 
available to a state’s citizens.
There is an interesting analogue to our 
proposal already being used at the state level. In 
the realm of education finance, there is a tension 
between the supposed efficiency and democratic 
accountability of local control versus the 
inequities that result from local control in a world 
where wealth is unevenly distributed. Ultimately, 
all states aim to strike a balance between those 
competing considerations, primarily through 
their tax systems. Sometimes the balance is 
explicit, as in Texas’s “Robin Hood” system, 
whereby wealthier school districts can provide 
more funding for themselves but must also pay 
into a fund for poorer districts.10 In other states, 
the state provides a foundation level of funding 
for all school districts using general tax dollars 
that individual districts can supplement with 
local taxes.11
States could approach health insurance 
regulation in a similar way if confronted by 
something like the Cruz proposal. On the one 
hand, under the Cruz proposal, the federal 
9
The BCRA would continue to offer subsidies to some poorer 
consumers in order to purchase compliant plans, but those 
subsidies would be smaller relative to the ACA, as would the 
number of consumers eligible for those reduced subsidies. See 
Karen Pollitz and Anthony Damico, “Uneven Playing Field: 
Applying Different Rules to Competing Health Plans,” Kaiser 
Family Foundation. The Kaiser Family Foundation estimates that 
there would be 6.1 million individuals who would not receive any 
credits under the BCRA, but who had under the ACA. Of these, the 
foundation estimated that about 1.5 million have preexisting 
conditions and thus would face extremely high premiums. Id.
10
That is a rough approximation of a complicated system with 
many options. For the law, see Texas Education Code chapter 41. 
See also, Texas Association of School Boards, “Overview of the 
School Finance System,” Financial Responsibility Guide (2016).
11
That is also a rough approximation. For a more precise 
overview, see Deborah A. Verstegen, “How Do States Pay for 
Schools? An Update of a 50-State Survey of Finance Policies and 
Programs” (2014).




ll rights reserved. Tax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
874  STATE TAX NOTES, AUGUST 28, 2017
government would allow those well-off (in health, 
wealth, or youth) to benefit from being able to 
purchase health insurance plans better tailored to 
their needs. That tailoring could be because of 
either socially beneficial innovation or the health 
plans cutting benefits for the sickest insureds 
while increasing benefits for the relatively 
healthy. By taxing noncompliant plans while 
providing tax credits to fund the purchase of 
compliant plans, state governments could 
counteract the incentives and social costs for 
insurers to take the second strategy.
Of course, state governments will not be able 
to strike that balance perfectly, no matter how 
well the taxes and subsidies are designed. One 
potential advantage of leaving the design of taxes 
and subsidies to state governments is that each 
state government could attempt to strike that 
balance based on its specific conditions and policy 
preferences.
More generally, we think health reform could 
benefit from more developed thinking about how 
state governments might play a useful role in 
concert with the federal government. However, 
understanding state taxing capacities and fiscal 
federalism will be essential for such thinking to 
bear fruit. We thus hope to continue to explore the 
intersections of health reform and state and local 
taxation in future scholarship, and we hope others 
will join us in this effort. 
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